Abstract: This paper reflects upon the role of law in the contemporary surge in global large-scale land acquisitions. Its point of reference is the land security of several billion rural poor who traditionally own and use untitled lands that are classified as state lands or unowned public lands in national laws. Most of the affected lands are off-farm areas including forests, marshlands, and rangelands. Investors target these lands in belief they are unowned. Governments concur, selling or leasing these lands on grounds of being technically the lawful owner and despite awareness that these lands are occupied and used. Despite the longstanding nature of such conflicts as well known and long debated, the present land rush brings unresolved contradictions between statutory and customary law and associated meanings of property firmly to the fore. Using Sub-Saharan Africa as the example, this paper examines the legal effects. It is shown that while millions of local land rights are threatened, the land rush also vitalises demands for improved national law status for unregistered customary rights, including those such as forest and rangelands purposely held by communities in common. To this extent, the contemporary rush could prove as much legal friend as foe to majority land rights in agrarian economies. This is partly because the current rush, unlike those that have gone before it, occurs in an environment of advanced popular communication, emergent mass empowerment, and has the advantage of a pre-rush era of legal improvement in the handling of indigenous and customary land rights that has established alternative precedents. Opportunities to coerce modification of classical dispossessory paths of economic growth strongly exist. Global advocacy for secure community land rights is rapidly advancing.
Introduction
The global land rush refers to the surge in large-scale land acquisitions in developing economies triggered by the oil, food supply, and financial crises of 2006-2008. 1 Although land buy-ups by local companies and individual entrepreneurs are closely intertwined with the surge in foreign acquisitions, the latter are more prominent in terms of scale and implications, inter alia generating charges of new forms of colonialism. Objectives of large-scale acquisitions remain mixed, ranging from genuine intentions to produce food and biofuel crops at scale as a hedge against unstable commodity markets, to speculative acquisitions encouraged by availability of surplus cash withdrawn from enterprises deemed risky following the credit crisis.
In mid-2013, it is unclear whether the rush is gathering pace or receding. This is despite expensive initiatives launched to track its scope, 2 high levels of mainly adverse publicity, 3 advisories issued by international organisations cautioning investors and host governments against wilful removal of people from traditional lands, 4 a gathering number of early failures of schemes reminiscent of comparable botched large-scale land projects of earlier decades, 5 and with the active support of governments with whom private enterprise in less developed polities is often linked in personal ways.
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In respect of Sub-Saharan Africa, Issa Shivji, prefacing able research by Patnaik and Moyo on the relationship of the current rush with global capitalism, reminds us of three facts of direct relevance to this exposition; first, that the iron rule of five centuries of capitalism has consistently delivered accumulation at one end of society and pauperisation at the other; second, that Africa has endured the greatest social devastation in this process, inclusive of millions of its people being sold into slavery to support growth in other continents and steady pillage since of its land, forests, minerals, water, and bioresources; and third that accumulation by dispossession lies so fundamentally at the heart of the world system of capitalism that the capitalism system itself must be held as primitive.
12 While Shivji, Patnaik, and Moyo urge abandonment of this mode of "barbarous" growth, we can here be more practically warned that outright derailment of its path will be difficult. The research of Lee Peluso and Lund on governance issues associated with this current phase of social transformation, of Murray Li on its labour dynamics, and of McMichael on changing food supply regimes, which often drive surges in capitalist growth, tend to confirm difficulties in countering what seems like the inevitability of mass dispossession of rights and resources in social transformation. 13 Descriptive accounts of how the current rush is playing out, such as latterly by Borras, Franco, and Wang, suggest similarly. 14 This paper, however, focuses upon the legal dynamics of dispossession itself and in the process offers a less pessimistic future. It is argued that in the same way as state law has been put to work to legitimise mass land takings, with active awareness and prompt action, it could be put to work to serve majority land interests and restructure if not halt longstanding legal conventions in this area. In exploring this, the paper is less interested in the classical central ground of property relations, the tenure of the house and farm, than in the many times greater space which is occupied by off-farm resources, and which are so consistently and characteristically deemed by statutory property law to be effectively unowned, and even unownable. This is profoundly contradicted by local reality and by the terms of indigenous or customary land norms, which on the contrary locate collectively possessed forests, rangelands, and marshlands as deeply central to the property norms of rural communities.
The precise objective of this paper is to examine whether the contemporary land rush is deepening this legal contradiction further. In the course of this, a salient aspect of land rushes is illustrated; that despite the alarm they generate, rushes have rarely proved lasting or complete in their capture of local lands by large-scale land enterprise. Nor do they, or the contextual political and economic transformations from which they descend, appear to successfully extinguish local land rights in their entirety. For example, despite a century of harshly suppressive state land law in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, customary land claims have ultimately proved sufficiently resilient to require expensive compensation and restitution schemes. 15 These well-known cases also illustrate the inextricable relationship of land and property rights with socio-economic and political rights, locating the issue firmly in the sphere of governance. The fact that remedies in those cases are still far from delivered after two decades also reminds us of the tenacity of contrary dispossessory norms and that pro-majority tenure reforms are difficult to secure in practice. A subtle transformation in rights themselves underwrites these battles over land and associated wealth and power, and which broadly play out as contestation between people and the state, and their respective national and local systems for protecting the private possession of lands. Thus, when community landholders are confronted with challenges as to their rights, they often respond expediently by reconstructing their rights in the image of better-protected statutory entitlements, including claims of absolute possession and tradability. While this principally requires a buy-in by communities into notions of land as a disposable commodity, and associated individualisation, it also prompts shifts in the meaning of property as real property without necessarily being tradable. This is especially important in respect of communal resources, wherein the community is a continuing social entity over time. How modern tenure law handles those generally off-farm assets is the area where most contention and alteration is being experienced today, along with shifts in the understanding of communities as legal entities, competent to hold such assets collectively.
The global land rush enters the fray in the midst of such transitions. Therefore, while the initial impact (or fear of impact) of the current rush is wrongful but legal dispossession of poor rural communities at scale, there is countering potential for populations to challenge and refashion this path. Their success would not so much halt the land rush as coerce shifts in its modus operandi to modify its dispossessory effects. Key indicators to keep watch upon will be how far legal classification of lands as state properties rises or declines as a proportion of total country areas in favour of acknowledged community owned lands; how far industrial land developments evolve on the basis of leasing directly from communities, rather than from governments, and how far newly acknowledged community landowners are included as shareholders in commercial land developments where their lands are being used. Even a limited shift towards these innovations would mark an important turning point towards more popularly inclusive routes of land-based growth. The direction of modern land law on these matters is crucial.
Land rushes and the law
This is not least because, with exceptions, the dominant norm in national legislation globally is, as suggested earlier, that lands not formally titled are not state-acknowledged real property. This leaves millions of rural dwellers technically landless, permissive occupants on land acquired through nonstate community-based regimes, usually termed customary or indigenous tenure regimes. National laws generally override interests delivered through such regimes. In the absence of acknowledged owners, affected lands usually fall to government as its private property (and particularly where these lands are forested or included marshlands), as national property under its trust, or as public lands, which again the state may allocate as if empty of existing owners.
While uncertainty of rights may prevail for generations, surges in state allocation of such domains bring the contradictory claims of customary and statutory tenure to the fore. This is what is occurring in the current land rush, for it is mainly such lands that are being handed over at scale to investors or speculators, in pursuit of classical visions of domestic and global growth.
Untitled but customarily occupied or used lands that could be affected by the current (or subsequent) land rushes are significant in area. It is well to remember that only 11% of the world's land surface is cultivated, the greater resource being off-farm lands, and over which thousands of communities sustain communal norms of possession, access, and use. 16 The roles that such offfarm lands play in household economies range from being significant to representing the major source of livelihood. 17 In terms of area, such assets comprise 8.5 billion ha, excluding waters, foreshores, and extreme deserts, of which 2.35 billion hectares (ha) are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. Less than 10% of this area is privately titled and accordingly outside the customary sector. 18 Cities and towns absorb another 1% of land area. 19 Of the remaining 2.1 billion ha, only 8%
is permanent farmland (168 million ha). This leaves 1.93 billion ha of forestlands, rangelands, 20 and wetlands. Some 320 million ha of this has already been withdrawn from community jurisdiction as gazetted national parks and reserves, a process that normally extinguishes customary rights. An unknown part of the remainder is genuinely unowned, in the sense of being beyond the historical or present jurisdiction of any one rural community. This still leaves a potential 1.6 billion ha of contradictory customary-statutory claim, which the land rush now brings into clearer contestation. Significant parts of these lands were already leased out prior to the current land rush, mainly under extractive concessions to oil, gas, timber, and mining companies. For example, half the country areas of Cameroon and Gabon were subject to logging and concessions by 2005, overlaid by concessions for exploratory or extractive mining. 21 As elsewhere in the continent millions of people live within these areas, depend upon them for livelihood, and claim them as historically and contemporarily their collective property, the dictates of national property law notwithstanding.
Global adoption and entrenchment of dispossessory land law
A background word must be said on how the contradictions between customary and statutory tenure norms have come about. In brief, these have origins in the state-making norms of European states, whereby kings sought control over as much land as possible to bolster their authority and their treasuries. English land law, for example, evolving through the creation of the post-indigenous Norman feudal state from the eleventh century, reconstructed land ownership as a lien or gift of the King, separating possession by commoners from legal title awarded to elites in return for their military and financial support. 22 Land taxes in turn provided the core of state revenue and its survival. By 1436 nearly half of England's lands were controlled by 51 barons, inextricably bound to the state, precisely because their land assets were dependent upon sustained state recognition of their tenure.
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In due course English kings would pursue offshore the same land-capturing colonialism its indigenous populations endured, most notably in Ireland in the early seventeenth century. In 1608, for example, the King Court in London reconstructed the meaning of local Irish customary land law and rights as amounting to less than property, precisely in order to be able to lawfully take those lands at scale as unowned; this opened the way for Irish lands in virtually their entirety to be reallocated to English nobles for plantation developments.
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In 1813, the new American Supreme Court engineered a similar denial of attributes of real property to native Indian landholding, for the same purpose of denying that their lands were already owned, and reconstructing these as lands that only the individual state governments could allocate. 25 By then this had philosophical support; although John Stuart Mills was yet to develop his defining thesis on property (1859), John Locke (1689) had already established the notion that property only comes about by the will of the state. Adam Smith (1776) had also helpfully established that property only comes into being by man's labour, not that this applies to large land acquirers. The courts of the Spanish, Portuguese, Belgians, Dutch, and French were no less skilled than the English in creating law to support massive capture of lands all around the globe. 
Dispossessing Africans, 1885
Therefore, by the time 14 plenipotentiaries of European states (including America, Russia, and Ottoman Empire) met in Berlin in 1884-1885 to divvy up Africa into preferential trading zones, they were practised in legal justification that the lands and resources they wanted were unowned. Accordingly, the international law arising out of Berlin, the General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa, 26 February 1885, only required the signatories to establish sufficient authority "to protect existing rights", meaning their own rights, not those of natives (Article 35). Africans were not entirely forgotten; the Powers (as they referred to themselves) were to hold a watching brief over their moral wellbeing "to bring home to them the blessings of civilization" (Article 6). While initially the Powers had no intention to create expensive colonies (this was already problematic in other continents), the necessity for this emerged almost immediately as the free trade agreements collapsed, each Power competing to control the African market for disposing the cotton, copper, and other manufactures lying unsold in depressed Europe, to capture African coffee, tea, fruit, and sugar production to feed their own expanding middle classes, to protect their rapidly expanding rubber, oil palm, and sisal plantations, and to secure for themselves the gold, ivory, timber, and other riches of the continent. It is also worth noting that the financial crisis and depression of the 1880-1890s era also left what Hobsbawn describes as cash-rich entrepreneurs with money burning holes in their pockets and looking for new spheres wherein to invest.
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Proof that Africa was unowned became a crucial task in lawfully capturing African lands, not least to forestall reaction at home by religious and humanist activists who had recently forced the ending of the slave trade. Solutions were delivered in tens of sovereignty-cum-property laws enacted for colonies between 1895 and 1914. 27 Predictably, these established International agribusiness was a main beneficiary, including oil palm companies in Ghana, Firestone rubber in Liberia, Brooke Bond, and Del Monte tea and fruit conglomerates in Kenya, and ranching schemes in South Africa.
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All this land taking through the twentieth century was complemented by state capture of all waters, foreshores, beaches, oils, minerals, marshlands and often forests, woodlands and rangelands, even though at home in Europe (and America) private ownership usually encompassed rights above and below the soil, and also, in civil law, permitted small waters to be owned. 36 These grabs were reinforced from the 1940s by a wave of land takings in the form of gazetting forest reserves for state capture of lucrative hardwoods, then cleared for replanting of (then) Protected Areas, now numbering 320 in Sub-Saharan Africa, absorbing millions of hectares. The coerced commodity production on peasant farms that accompanied much of the above through the twentieth century was just as provocative, and through the necessity to also pay hut taxes drove a great deal of migration, displacement, and land loss.
38 Latter-day colonial policies during the 1950s compounded mass insecurity, in declared aims and emergent titling programmes to suppress family and communal tenure in favour of individualisation and associated policies to hasten concentration into landowning and landless classes to provide the labour needed for new waves of commercial land enterprise and hoped for urban industrialisation. 39 As independence loomed, European capitals also hastened to position themselves as key beneficiaries of raw materials and commodities, such as they intended in the 1880s, exemplified in the determination of De Gaulle to refashion the French colonies into a French Federation. Such strategies were not rejected by emerging African elites allied with the colonial administrations, so much as these raised the ire of African elites at being excluded from the rewards of large-scale land capture, and which were still being periodically awarded Europeans. 40 African society had rarely been equitable and with origins often in slave and commodity trading families or chiefdoms, elites had gained immensely from the encouragement given to mission schools through the century and had been routinely co-opted, as regional guards or as local administrators in the Indigenat or British Indirect Rule regimes from the 1920s. By the late 1950s, the separation of elite land interests from the poorer majority were ripe for renewed legal entrenchment favouring the former. Bayart, in his brilliant exposition of the politics of the belly during this and later years, and Chabal and Dauloz in their analysis of neopatrimonial relations in Africa, amply illustrate the dynamics of elite-driven interests during the pre-and post-independence era. These dynamics help explain why so few new African nations (roughly 40 independent states were created between 1956 and 1975) did not take independence as opportunity to liberate their people's land rights from introduced European norms and instead confirmed and even expanded lawful dispossession of their own citizens through denial of customary land interests as having force and effect as property.
42 By the 1980s a plethora of semi-autonomous government agencies were additionally beneficiaries of vast acreages of lands presumed legally to be unowned. These parastatals were usually run by associates of politicians and civil servants, who have been as frequently the leading beneficiaries of lands when these parastatals eventually began to be dismantled during the 1990s. 43 The average size of peasant farms also plummeted, involuntary farm landlessness rising by the 1990s to South Asian levels of the 1970s. In Kenya, for example, 3% of the population then and now control at least 20% of the land.
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As illustrated below in the case of Tanzania, post-colonial land law continued to ease paths of eviction and dispossession. Where affected communities protested loss of their lands, new legislation was introduced to remove doubts as to the legality of land takings. In Sudan, for example, this was accomplished by the Unregistered Land Act, 1970, to allow 5 million ha of Nuba and Funj lands to be legally allocated to elite Sudanese and Middle Eastern investors, prompting these populations to join Southern Sudanese in their war with Khartoum (1984 Khartoum ( -2002 . The upshot for these and other affected rural populations across the continent was that they had even less legal security in 1990 than they had possessed in 1890, and the risk of losing land in practice had grown exponentially.
African land reform and the land rush
A wave of land reform has slowly crept across the continent since 1990. This has been unlike the redistributive farmland reforms of the twentieth century in Asia and Latin America in that in Africa, reformism has focused on three other issues: (i) mechanisms for more effective land administration, tending towards devolved processes; (ii) the status of majority rural customary land rights; and (iii) (often contradictory) strategies to make untitled land more freely available to local and foreign investors. 45 While political democratisation, ending of civil wars, and the final demise of white rule in Southern Africa have been shapers of policies, initial drivers to launch tenure reform have commonly been to comply with the structural adjustment demands imposed by international financial institutions to make land available for private investors, local and international. As a consequence, new land policies and laws have rarely delivered consistent, radical or definitively pro-majority visions of land rights. Instead they are characterised by dual strategies, on the one hand aiming to protect local rights, while with the other hand promoting pro-investor strategies in a manner that threatens local rights. Contradictions tend to be ignored or protested as not existing. Thus, the new Liberian National Tenure Policy declares that "the principles of economic growth and tenure security are not in conflict with one another but are complementary", 46 but fails to lay out how the estimated 57% of Liberia which the state has leased to large companies, much of it in the last five years, will be recovered by customary land owners whose rights are declared protected. Additionally, constructs for group rights are often awkwardly posed in many new national land laws, and yet embraces the greater proportion of customary lands. Broadly, the results of land law reformism for community-derived land rights have been mixed. Six states (Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, South Sudan, and Madagascar) have adjusted laws to award customary rights equivalent force and effect as real property rights, irrespective of whether or not these are surveyed and registered, and/or held by individuals, families, or communities. Ghana and Botswana had undertaken this much earlier (in 1896 and 1968, respectively) . Imperfections abound in the norms of all eight states. Another 12 states (Kenya, South Africa, Liberia, Namibia, Senegal, Benin, Sierra Leone, Angola, Nigeria, Malawi, Gambia, and Togo) have done so in more proscribed manner or have promises and plans in progress, in the form of new policies and new laws.
This still leaves most African states as having taken no or very limited steps towards liberating their citizens' land interests from a century of dispossessory legislation and policies. Some of these have in fact taken alternative routes, such as through extinguishing customary land rights altogether (Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Rwanda). Some do acknowledge in policies or laws that certain customary holdings could be acknowledged as real property but limit this to homesteads and/or offer routes that require extinction of the customary right in favour of applying to purchase (their own) untitled lands, or similar routes discouraging to customary majorities. The most resistant to tenure reform (political pledges to reform aside) are mainly Congo Basin and Sahelian States, such as Cameroon, Gabon, Central African Republic, Mali, Mauritania, and Sudan. Zimbabwe also falls in this category, having ironically liberated lands held by white farmers while forcefully retaining a situation in which communal lands remain vested in the President, with absolute powers of disposition. Sudan, another example, continues to fail to meet restitution commitments agreed in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement following the 24-year long North-South War.
Meanwhile, it may be cursorily observed that no African country has yet seen fit to liberate state capture of all waters, beaches, foreshores, minerals, and oils with restitution of possibilities for communities to recover relevant local assets in the future, such changes as there have been uniformly in the direction of availing affected communities social services or other such facilities, termed benefit-sharing, remote from resource-sharing. Nor are communities yet permitted to become owners of protected areas, sustaining the convenient fiction that valuable resources require state ownership to be conserved, notable exceptions being South Africa and Tanzania.
The overall result is that a small proportion of African customary lands are secured in principle or practice. Even accounting for promised changes in Kenya, which is in process of preparing a Community Lands Bill, only 220 million ha on the subcontinent are (to one degree or another) recognised as customary property, just over 10% of all untitled African lands. Among these, the most substantial and firmly secured lands are those categorised as Village Lands in Tanzania, extending over 69% of the total country area, a case elaborated later.
The role of the land rush in tenure reform
By 2010 it was becoming apparent that the land rush was putting a halt to fragile moves towards pro-poor tenure reform cursorily described above. There was (and still is) substantive evidence of this in the slow-down of production of promised new national land policies where these have been pledged by sitting commissions, or by failure to entrench new policies in new law. Cases in point include The Gambia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, DRC, Cameroon, and Mauritania. In other cases, shortfall accountable at least in part to the land rush is where laws turn out to be significantly less people-friendly than originally posed (e.g. Lesotho (2010) and Burundi (2011)).
It is also the case that some of those countries which did produce reformist pro-majority land law since 1990 have sought since to renege on provisions precisely to ease investor access further. Amendments, attempts to amend, and reinterpretation of articles have been used. In Ethiopia, for example, enablement for communities to secure off-farm lands under collective title (2005) has been reinterpreted as excluding the major resource in key regional states, pastoral lands, and increasingly, all off-farm lands. In Tanzania, contradictory definition of unoccupied and unused village lands in the two land laws of 1999 are being used to justify land takings along with much reduced compensation to communities. In Mozambique there was a clear attempt in 2012 to limit the size of area which a community may delimit and receive formal entitlement. In Uganda, legal provision of national and local government rights to valuable lands has been used to take community rangelands on this basis, including defeat of a legal challenge against this. The new South Sudan administration has also justified deals with investors for vast lands on grounds that the law does permit it to declare investment areas, with ambivalent requirement for local consent.
On the other hand, the land rush is generating such increasing local reaction that subordination of majority rural rights shows signs of becoming less easy. This may prove to be the case even in the most recalcitrant of cases, such as in Cameroon and Gabon, both governed by leaders considered among "the world's worst living dictators". 47 The surge in mining and timber concessions (mainly to China) and fewer but very large leases to American, European, and Malaysian rubber and oil palm developers is prompting a sharp rise in civil society mobilisation, and politicisation around land rights, along with substantial reprimand by international NGOs. The case is similar to one degree or another for all African states at this time. In Namibia, for example, popular reaction against accumulating capture of local grazing lands by elites (often from the capital) has boiled over in demands for the Communal Lands Reform Act, 2002 to be revisited. In Kenya, rewrite of a rejected Community Lands Bill of 2011 is stretching constitutional provisions to their limit, including proposals to facilitate restitution of forest and wildlife reserves. In Senegal, having failed to secure support for a law favouring investor interests, a redraft of new land law is underway. Meanwhile, despite the rush, Benin (2007) and Burkina Faso (2009) managed to see through fairly radical new land laws into enactment, protecting majority rural land interests, explicitly inclusive of valuable but vulnerable off-farm commons.
In short, it is not clear whether the land rush will succeed in capturing large lands in the untitled sector and/or sustain this in the longer term. A longer term perspective may be necessary. To exemplify the case thus far, a snapshot of land law change in Liberia and Tanzania over the last century is provided below.
Acknowledging community lands in Liberia
Liberia is exceptional as the only African state to have an American colonial history, strictly speaking in the form of state-backed colonisation societies formed in America following the liberation of African slaves, with the aim of returning volunteers to Africa. As was the case with merchant and mission enterprises in coastal Africa at the time, these societies formally purchased lands along the coast of what is now Liberia during 1820 and 1956 from local chiefdoms, signalling awareness that these lands were African property. 50 It was not until the expansion of the Republic of Liberia (1847) into hinterlands after 1885 to limit 1880-1890s land grabs from Britain to the north (Sierra Leone) and from France from the south (Côte d'Ivoire) that the question arose as to whether Liberia should pay for these vast new territories inland. The Supreme Court eventually put an end to contentious debate within the Monrovian government as to the status and rights of Aborigines in these hinterlands (as they were called) in 1920, by ruling that it had been "unnecessary to seek or secure the willing consent of uncivilised people as through (their subordination) Aborigines gained civilisation". Hinterland chiefs were less compliant, and within three years they had secured a law for the Hinterland which enabled the "right and title for an adequate area for farming and other enterprises essential to the necessities of the tribe …" to be retained (Suehn Conference of Hinterland Chiefs, 1923, entering into Regulations variously retained until 1949). Additionally, these areas could be converted into "a formal communal holding upon application … surveyed at the expense of the tribe concerned". Further, "should the tribe become sufficiently advanced in the arts of civilization, it may petition Government for a division of the land into family holdings" of 25 acres each, held under fee simple (Article 66, Hinterland Law, 1949) .
Between 1924 and 1968 13 Hinterland chiefdoms secured nearly 1 million ha under communal Aboriginal Title Deeds (ibid: 117). Others either did not know of the opportunity, were insufficiently organised and solvent to take advantage of this, or were simply confident that Monrovia would not infringe upon their lands, even without deeds, as the same Regulation had additionally pledged. This more or less lasted until the land rush generated by the Open Door Policy announced by President Tubman in 1944; between 1951 and 1961 this resulted in a massive transfer of customary lands to foreign mining (iron ore), rubber and lumbering companies and a good deal less compensatory employment than promised, engendering the term "growth without development", reflecting unparalleled growth but income accruing almost exclusively to foreign companies and Americo-Liberian elites.
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The Hinterland Law was quietly modified in 1956 in support of the policy, reducing the "right and title" of customary owners to "the use of as much public land in the area as required for farming and other enterprises essential to tribal necessities" (The Aborigines Law, Section 270, Title 1 Liberian Code of Laws, 1956 Laws, -1958 . This was confirmed by revisions to the longstanding Public Lands Act and by enactment of a new Land Registration Act in 1974. These established that individuals and communities in the Hinterland could acquire formal ownership only by buying (their own lands) from the State, now the titular owner.
The value of pre-existing Aborigines Deeds was also thrown into doubt by the gazettement of 1.35 million ha of prime forestlands as National Forests in 1960-1961, extinguishing customary rights with no compensation. Land and resource grievances contributed to civil war , reaching a nadir in 2000 with a new forest law enacted by the Charles Taylor administration which bluntly declared that all forest resources were Republic property; these cover nearly 60% of the country and accordingly roughly 60% of all community lands.
Cancellation of all concessions was an obligatory pledge for Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to attain the Presidency in 2005, with production of a new Forest Act in 2006 and a Community Rights Law in Respect of Forest Lands in 2009. The latter acknowledges that forest resources on community lands belong to communities (Section 2.2). As important, the law defines community land as "[a]n area over which a community traditionally extends its proprietorship and jurisdiction, and is recognised as such by neighbouring communities" (Articles 1 and 2.2).
Nevertheless, reissue of private concessions restarted promptly, so that today over half the country is leased for oil palm and rubber plantations or to lumbering and mining developments. 53 Popular protest has been active, targeted especially to grants of 440,000 ha to Malaysian and American oil palm companies, and to comparable deals to mining giants Chevron Petroleum and BHP.
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Audits have shown that only 2 of 68 contracts are even lawful. 55 This has coerced some retraction in Government protection of deals it has authorised including suspension of another set of unlawfully acquired Private Use Permits for timber extraction involving 2.5 million ha (23% of the country area). As in the 1950s, many of the beneficiaries are local elites, and sometimes from within the community. 56 Civil society has not been shy to investigate and document cases, bringing home reality that local leaders within poor communities are not immune from taking advantage of poor governance of the law.
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While allegations of nepotism and corruption plague Sirleaf's administration, Liberia -like Cameroon and many other states in the region -publicly committed to tenure reform. Liberia has pursued this most actively, with production of the new National Land Tenure Policy in June 2013. 58 The Policy aims, inter alia, to put into law protection of customary rights as Private Land rights, whether recorded or not, and lays particular emphasis upon the identification of community land areas by rural communities to confirm these rights within community-based governance regimes. This would return citizen land rights and localised land governance to broadly the situation they were in between 1923 and 1956. However, the Policy also pledges to make land available to commercial land investors. It also permits and therefore encourages customary landholders to sell their lands in the open market place. Both threaten attrition of community lands. The Policy also lacks procedures of discovery prior to state sale of lands, which it continues to contradictorily present as unowned public lands, even though these may be occupied and claimed as customary estates. Without formal obligation to discover rights prior to lease to investors, customary land holders will continue to find their lands taken under their feet.
Acknowledging community lands in Tanzania
In highland Tanganyika, German settlement following the Berlin Act in 1855 was so rapacious that the British Government, also land grabbing to the north (Kenya) forced the drawing up of a Delimitation Treaty, 1888. This, together with fierce resistance by coastal Arab and indigenous inland communities to land grabbing by European profiteers forced Germany to declare a militarily backed protectorate over Tanganyika, Burundi, and Ruanda in 1891. By 1896 and 1903 Berlin was trying to halt the profiteering itself, requiring Germans to show cultivation of half the lands they had acquired through one means or another to qualify for freehold entitlement. 59 Forced labour for plantations, road building, and railways and imposition of hut taxes added to local grievance, flight and rebellion, including at Maji Maji where 75,000 Africans were killed between 1905 and 1907 for refusing to grow cotton for Germany. Conciliatory plans by the liberal Governor Rechenberg (1906 Rechenberg ( -1912 to enable natives to produce cash crops on their own land were rejected by the new plantation sector as reducing the forced labour they needed to support the home economy. More compliant and rewarded chiefs were also appointed to serve the Administration's objectives. Ordinance, 1923) . The League of Nations disputed this development as contrary to the mandate, which was to protect natives, not to colonise the territory.
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After five years of debate, the Land Ordinance was grudgingly modified, with redefinition of a Right of Occupancy to include "the title of a native community lawfully using or occupying land in accordance with native law and custom", to be known as a Deemed Right of Occupancy (1928) . In practice, there was no equivalency between formally Granted and Deemed rights, Africans continuing to be evicted at will to make way for new waves of settlers and investor schemes between 1930 and 1958. One of the more notorious was the short-lived groundnut scheme (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) that set out to convert five million acres into food and oil production for post-War Europe, failing, but in the process denuding one million acres of local community lands.
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Protests at land taking continued with major actions in 1937, 1946, 1953, and 1955 as land taking enterprise such as Uluguru and Sukumaland Schemes took more and more customary property. By the 1950s Tanganyikan farmers were "more ready to resist than they had been in 1905 … and better organized". 63 One dispute eventually came before the Trusteeship Council of the League of Nations (1952) but failed to counter British arguments that it concerned a strictly internal affair. This resulted in the most meagre of amendments to the Land Ordinance, with insertion of requirement that there be more consultation prior to orders to local populations to remove themselves from an area. 64 Evictions continued for a host of schemes, and in addition, for extractive forest and wildlife reserves under a new Public Lands (Preserved Areas) Ordinance, 1954. Nationalisation characterised post-Independence (1961) law, the ultimate title of all land in the country vested in the President as Public Land. Nyerere argued that government was the rightful inheritor of pre-colonial communal tribal tenure, serving in effect as the new super-tribe. Freeholds were abolished in 1963, converted to 99-year leaseholds, in turn converted into Granted Rights of Occupancy in 1969 with limited powers to sell or sub-let. Additional laws were enacted to stamp out landlordism and land commoditisation and concentration, visibly active from the 1950s in most fertile areas.
In practice, community-based tenure steadily evolved in the 1970s and 1980s through radical new rural settlement and development policies which restructured scattered hamlets as formal villages with public services and their own governments, entrenched in The Villages and Ujamaa Villages (Designation, Registration and Administration) Act, 1975 and the Local Government (District Authorities) Act, 1982 . New agricultural policy (1985 , 1987 directed the Ministry of Lands to issue Village Land Titles to elected village governments, instructed them to in turn issue leaseholds to individual members of the community for their homesteads. Over 600 of 8,219 village governments received such deeds before the strategy was undermined as lacking legal backing.
In the meantime, a contrary policy of land taking afflicted more and more communities, Government forcefully using its ultimate landlord powers aided by enactment of the Rural Lands (Planning and Utilization) Act, 1973 . During the 1980s a series of Orders were passed under this law, extinguishing customary rights over large areas to make way for burgeoning state agribusinesses, or to hand over to related investor schemes such as the Canadian Government-backed wheat schemes of Mbulu, or to privatised seed bean and sisal developments, reminiscent of colonial large-scale land schemes of the 1910s, 1930s, and 1950s. Those evicted again began to take their grievances to court.
In response the Regulation of Land Tenure (Established Villages) Act, 1992 was enacted, extinguishing all customary rights throughout the country. This was justified as necessary to remove the confusion as to the status of customary lands left when homesteaders had moved into aggregated villages during the 1970s. 66 Critics were not slow to declare the law a poorly veiled attempt to rob the population of their lands, pointing to the structural adjustment demands of IMF loans to the Government as the trigger for this. The hasty passage of the law was not coincidental. It was designed to counteract the recommendations of a major land investigation commission, reporting to the President at the same time. 67 The Commission urged the President to surrender ultimate title and to vest this directly in rural communities. It also recommended that title over non-village lands including parks and During debates for new policy in 1995, Government conceded support for customary rights as property interests but stood firm against surrender of its ultimate title, although allowing caveat that this would be held henceforth on a trustee basis for the nation. Most other recommendations of the Commission were adopted into the new National Land Policy in 1995.
70 Meanwhile neighbouring Uganda picked up the baton and abolished state tenure in its new postcivil war Constitution of the same year. One of the most important new strategies was to reverse gathering political intention by the post-Nyerere Administration of Tanzania to recentralise governance away from ever-more autonomous village governments. Instead, the National Land Policy declared that village governments would be the lawful land managers of all land matters including issue of customary title within the domains over which they respectively presided.
Additionally, the Policy and eventual Village Land Act of 1999 counteracted rising government practice from the 1980s of recognising a village land area as limited to settlements and farms, excluding the community's often expansive off-farm lands. Options were laid out through which a community could delimit its territory, including written negotiation and agreement by neighbouring communities (Section 7). Practically, no-man's lands between villages, claimable by the State, disappeared. The law reinforced inclusion of communal lands by requiring that these be identified and described in a Register of Communal Village Land (Section 13) prior to allocation of individual title to villages for their homesteads.
Loopholes remain through which Government and investors since have engineered takings of off-farm lands. One, mentioned earlier, is liability that remoter woodlands and rangelands can be defined as "unoccupied and unutilised village lands", defined inconsistently by one of the land laws of 1999 as General Land (Government Land). Even without this, communities have been persuaded with promises of jobs and services to surrender off-farm lands to Government for re-issuance to investors.
71 By 2009, President Kikwete, as chair of a major business sector organisation, published a new farming policy (Kilimo Kwanza Resolution, 2009) including a main objective to amend the Village Land Act of 1999 to more directly free up land for investors. This has not yet met support in the Parliament and may not in the foreseeable future, given growing public dismay at continuing evictions in service of public interest which turns out to be mainly private. These range from removing peri-urban communities for housing developments, to green grabs in the form of Controlled Hunting Areas overlaid on village lands, to a series of semi-coerced surrender of village lands to private companies for large-scale tree planting for companies to earn carbon credits and timber plantations.
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Enactment of the Land Use Planning Act, 2007, has inadvertently contributed to concern by laying down such complicated planning requirements for villages, that issue of Certificates of Village Land (CVL) has come almost to a halt; without this village governments are practically but not lawfully designated as land managers. By 2011, only 812 of 12,000 þ villages had received their CVL.
The Land Use Planning Act of 2007 also eases the path through which Government may remove lands from a village, for planning purposes. This added to provisions from a 2004 amendment of the 1999 Land Act making it legal for investors who acquire village lands through Government to sub-lease and even sell on their lease. This has made speculative acquisitions easier, allowing investors to sell on the land for profit should their enterprises fail. Cases of this began to appear by 2010, in which villages that had been encouraged to surrender off-farm lands in return for social agreements that jobs and services would be provided, lost both lands and these benefits when failing companies sold on the land to other companies with whom the communities have no such deals.
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At the time of writing in mid-2013, public wariness against legal changes is at an all time high following the announcement of the Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism that 1,500 sq. km of village land belonging to pastoralists will be gazetted as a Controlled Hunting Area for lease to a Dubai hunting company, with which leading politicians have long had links.
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The reaction of affected pastoralists was so strong that the Minister felt compelled to publish a two-page defence in local and regional press, claiming he was hurt that Government's generosity in allowing the 70,000 pastoralists affected to retain 2,500 sq. km was not appreciated (The East African, April 20-26, 2013: 30-31) . His position replays the Lockean thesis that citizens only secure rights to land as and when the State so recognises these, and for which the principal instrument has been registration of documented ownership or deeds testifying to transfers. This contradicts the terms of the Village Land Act, which does not require customary landholders to declare or register their rights. This suggests that even a decade after the law came into force, that its terms are not well-absorbed or accepted by all officials and politicians. Press and public reaction was swift and sharp. The most effective expression of discontent was not through sit-ins at government offices and Parliament during early 2013 but the widely filmed act of some thousands of women from the affected communities dumping their party cards in sack-loads on the steps of local ruling party offices. As the strength of opposition parties has steadily grown since the institution of a multi-party system in the early 1990s, and with elections around the corner in 2014, this unsettled the ruling party. The Prime Minister recalled the decision to gazette the Controlled Hunting Area "for further consultations" and follow-up communication with leaders of the affected communities suggests that no action will be taken in the meantime. 75 This was not the result that communities were seeking, and they worry that once the election is passed, the President will use force to take their lands. This could prove difficult in practice, given the level of local publicity and politicisation engendered by the dispute. 
Conclusions and policy implications
Above sections illustrate the way in which law both helps and hinders fulfilment of majority rights, in immediate or evolving ways. They also show that the law is, no matter how tightly drafted, vulnerable to reinterpretation whether propoor or pro-elite. It is also apparent that the 1890-1990 century saw legal provision for majority land security began better than it ended. Support for land rights on untitled lands plummeted with each phase of state-endorsed land grabbing, and up to the present eats away at laws that purport to provide remedy. While the current rush exacerbates contestation, it does so in a context that has longer origins of social transformation, within which there are advances and setbacks, with rarely complete resolution as to the real safety of majority customary tenure. It is also evident that that public protest is not new. Yet, there is a fair chance that civil society could prove more successful today in its claims than enjoyed by past generations. Reasons for this would include that affected persons are being heard in a more supportive international environment as illustrated in the issue of voluntary guidelines on tenure security issues and their uptake by national governments thus far (see Bruentrup et al. and Paoloni and Onorati, this issue) and by the fact that international advocacy groups, such as Oxfam International, the International Land Coalition, and Global Witness, have brought the status of community-derived land rights, and especially that of off-farm lands, to the forefront of their agendas. Communities are also better linked among themselves and with national and public forums through freer press and ever-expanding mobile phone and internet access. They are also better equipped educationally to argue their case in legal and political terms. With advancing democratisation they also have firmer political voice, including the potential to bring down governments. Finally, the boundaries of what constitutes property is steadily escaping the confines of received laws, which seemed for much of the twentieth century to be irrevocably dependent upon state-given and state-law bound entitlement.
This does not mean that the conflict of interest that underwrites social transformation and plays out broadly along rich and poor lines is dissolving. On the contrary, land rushes expectedly widen the divide. This is so much so that, as illustrated above, governments who introduced protective measures before the current rush show signs of regretting their benevolence. The fact that they are experiencing difficulty securing reversals or modifications in reform says more about the maturation of the state, including steady separation of executive and judicial powers and more obligatory distance between state and private interests, than a faux lessening of conflict of interest in modes of economic growth. Management of the conflict through compromise rather than hope that pressures will lessen seems the more reliable strategy.
Progress on compromise strategies is however quite limited. For example, there is not much sign of movement towards paths of economic growth that enable and require commercial land users to lease directly from traditional owners, or to oblige companies and parastatals to offer significant shareholding in their commercial enterprises to those landowners. More positively, pursuit of the legal grounds upon which this might become necessary does seem to be accelerating. I will focus briefly below on the most important development in this regard, the right of communities to secure all or part of their lands in common, as a private owner holding the asset in undivided shares.
Legal constructs for collective property
Broadly, there are two routes through which community-derived land rights may be secured: legal declamation or facilitated delimitation and entitlement.
Declamation or delimitation
The former is superior in that through enforcement of the appropriate law, millions of rural landholders in a country can move overnight from being permissive occupants of unowned/state lands to being legal owners, without proof of title in registered documentation. This occurred in Botswana in 1968 , in Uganda by constitutional provision in 1995 , in Tanzania in 1999 , and in Burkina Faso and South Sudan in 2009 . Untitled landholders in South Africa also secured constitutional acknowledgement of their untitled property interests, entrenched in the Interim Protection of Land Rights Act, 1996.
For this kind of blanket legal declamation to be effective, individuals, families, and communities holding unregistered community-derived rights need to be aware of the new legal protection and be availed easy and cheap paths to defend those rights. The law also needs to subject applications for private title to untitled lands to a rigorous procedure of discovery, to be sure that these lands are not already owned customarily. Given the passage of time, restitution of land or cash compensation is also needed to resolve many longstanding abuses of land taking power. In many laws not all these conditions are met. 
Domain or right-based delimitation
Moreover, advantageous as declamation is, delimitation on the ground is necessary to refine and double-lock in principle rights. This in turn can occur on a case-by-case basis or through sweeping definition of vast domains within which customary rights are protected. The domain model builds under colonial practices of setting aside native reserves, particularly adopted in Anglophone colonies. Some tenure reforms in Africa have reconstructed these into as, for example, the former homelands in South Africa, tribal lands in Botswana, communal lands in Namibia, village lands in Tanzania or gestions des terroirs in Senegal. The domain approach -at least in theory -makes it less necessary for each customary landholder (individual, family, or community) to specifically identify and secure its parcels. Permission may be required, but to a remote tribal-wide land board, which in practice reports upwards to central Government more than to its constituent communities.
Cases where the domain model does work well are Sierra Leone, Ghana, Togo, Burkina Faso, and Benin, and especially Tanzania. In the last case this is specifically due to each and every village community operating an elected government with full land powers, and which cannot easily, or legally, be sidestepped. In Sierra Leone and Ghana (and also Zambia), the fact that this authority is vested in chiefs does not necessarily advance accountability to community members, with sales of customary land by chiefs (lawfully or otherwise) quite widespread. It is also helpful in the Tanzanian land law paradigm that no non-member of the village may acquire land directly; this may only be accomplished through Government first acquiring that land from the village (which needs the latter's permission) and then leasing it to the applicant. While legal shortcomings have been remarked above, communities arguably feel more protected in village lands in Tanzania than they may feel, for example, in Mozambique, Angola, and Uganda in the absence of empowered village-level land authority and associated historical development of community land areas. Practically speaking, customary landholders in such states need to identify and physically delimit their lands, to secure the same level of protection.
Creating domains for tenure security
Not surprisingly, a quick route for this is first to identify the overall community land area and bring this under a single collective entitlement. This is the approach being followed by some communities in a number of African countries, usually with INGO or NGO assistance; this has been undertaken in a range of cases in South Africa (with help of the Communal Properties Association Act, 1996) , in Mozambique, with now around 320 of 3,000 communities securing formal entitlements for community lands, and more recently undertaken in Madagascar, Angola, Kenya, Uganda, and Liberia. Needless to say, the pressure of large-scale land acquisitions encourages this further, with community land delimitation also being adopted in some countries precisely to coerce new policy and legal provisions; the case in Sudan, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Malawi, and Gabon.
Differences exist in how easily delimitation of collectively owned lands is to undertake. Broadly, this is least easy where a community must form an alternative legal entity in order to be a legal person. This was the model adopted in South Africa by the Communal Property Associations Act, 1996, and adopted into the Uganda Land Act, 1998. The former saw minor uptake due to the complexities and costs involved, while no Ugandan community has yet seen fit to create a Communal Land Association for this purpose. More practical approaches are found in the laws of Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Benin, and South Sudan where first, a community exists by name as a legal person, and second, in the process of formalising customary rights the community may register these as owned by individuals, families, groups, or the whole community. Moreover, the procedure is to be performed at community level, using community-controlled land registers.
The old conundrum: communal or individual rights
Legal developments such as described above bring to the fore necessary decision as to what legal forms collective entitlement should take. A first option is issue of collective title for the entire community land area, most immediately suitable to hunter-gatherers and pastoralists. This has most in common with Native Title as adopted in especially Latin America and Australasia to meet the demands of indigenous peoples, and where as a result some 20% of Australia, 15% of Bolivia, 13% of Brazil, 5% of New Zealand and 3.4% of the Philippines is now under formal native title.
A second option is for the community to secure collective root title out of which individual and family usufructs are maintained, including those held effectively in perpetuity. A third option is for the community to seek collective entitlement only for those off-farm lands which it owns and wants to continue owning collectively, enabling individuals to secure private entitlement for their homesteads. A fourth approach is for a community to eschew any level of collective entitlement altogether, settling for entrenchment of community-based jurisdiction over all holdings within the traditional domain, to be administered on the basis of custom, or more accurately, modern-day community norms. This tends to appeal where little to no common lands remain but where communities prefer to use traditional rather than state laws to regulate their land relations, including to whom a villager may transfer his lands, without social sanction.
Not all new land laws in Africa provide easily for these choices, best articulated in legislation in Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Benin, and in other ways practised in Ghana in the form of customary freehold entitlements. Other new laws tend to make the choice for communities, equating customary land with an all-inclusive single collective title, which is the case for example in Mozambique and Angola. Alternatively, even best practice laws may weaken and confuse routes of formalisation by offering both statutory and customary routes of formalisation, the latter competing poorly with well-established statutory entitlements. This is the case in Uganda where customary landowners may entrench their rights under freehold or, less expensively, as a customary entitlement. This is similarly the case in Botswana in respect of private holdings. More seriously, while ample opportunity is given in Botswana and Namibia to formalise customary occupation of homesteads, no such opportunity is available in respect of off-farm lands which rural communities hold collectively. Instead, these vast lands in both countries are treated in effect as unowned and which senior authorities may allocate at will to individuals under leasehold tenure, and including for commercial livestock development purposes. Significant losses occur. For example, in the Okavango region of Namibia, over half the total land area has been rapidly "sold off" by land allocators to elites for establishment of vast private ranches, so that the local customary population is now squeezed into 45% of its traditional area.
The underlying conundrum: commoditisation
Decisions around the above tend to also impinge profoundly upon the central conundrum for many officials and indeed, community members, as to whether acknowledgement of customary rights as real property interests means that the law must legalise outright sale of those interests as autonomous commodities? This has been debated in the making of new land laws in most African states, with not always certain resolve, and continues to be an issue in current tenure debates in Kenya, Liberia, and Namibia (and likely elsewhere). The reiterated concern is that this opens the way to wanton attrition in community lands, including distress sales by poor families. While chiefs in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Zambia, and Malawi may limit this, they may also be party to unwarranted sales of non-privatised community lands intended for later generations.
Protection of rights from undue sales is probably best achieved in Tanzania, reminding us once again of the integral links between effective support for customary rights and developed community-based governance. This is because effectively limitations derive largely through a combination of active institutional governance within communities, legal strictures against transfers without the village government's permission, the outlawing of sales to most outsiders (NGOs or churches operating in the village are an exception) without Government first acquiring the land, and a legal condition that each community must ensure that every household has land to live on.
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There is pressure to remove these limitations from both within and without rural communities. The latter is interesting, and pressure may derive from urban residents seeking assurance that their home areas are not being sold off by chiefs, leaders, or being lost through preeminent state rights to take those lands and reallocate them at will to wealthy private land seekers or investors. It is notable that some of the greatest pressure for protection of customary rights in countries like Kenya, Gabon, and Liberia has derived from urban youth and members of rural communities who return to their home villages only once a year. While this expresses the increasingly complex nature of integrated rural and urban society within which some members may work in cities and towns and never live in the village again, it also expresses evolving notions of, and claims to, ancestral lands, which governments dismiss at their peril. Leaving the village, and urbanisation in general, does not necessarily mean leaving one's land rights behind. Moreover, these signal the emergence of new notions of property, which by definition the living residential community may never sell, but must hold for future generations.
Final word
The main ideas that this paper has sought to illustrate are first, a reminder of the old truth that national law is an instrument of state and is constructed and interpreted in the image of its policies, and that as these alter, interpretation of the law also alters; second, that land rushes characterise expanding capitalism, and with history behind us, can be expected to not only repeat themselves from time to time but also impact negatively upon institutionally and legally weaker majority agrarian land interests; and third, that each land rush has its distinctions. In the current rush, this includes both a (partially) altered legal environment for majority land rights in the selected example region, Sub-Saharan Africa, and a fast-altering socio-political environment, with a stronger possibility of more protective legal remedy eventually emerging. Additionally, new forms and notions of what constitutes real property are being promoted. Fourth, this paper has also attempted to show that a crucial legal tenure shift is towards heightened demand and some delivery of customary security approaches which at last look beyond the farm, tackling the tenure of lands that have customarily been usually collectively owned at extended family and especially community level. This is a new ambition of land reform, and accelerated, if not originally prompted, by the land rush. Main debates and distinctions among country strategies thus far have been around how accessibly this is provided for. Resistance against legal routes of collective entitlement can also be anticipated as this extends to a degree that interferes with persisting landlordist ambitions of Governments. This is already being felt in countries where legal regimes best secure untitled customary lands in general. How far provisions for securitisation in principle and on-the-ground delimitation and entitlement of community lands in particular will multiply will be a main indicator within five to ten years as to how far land law is proving more friend than foe to majority rural poor, in the face of the contemporary land rush. In this regard, politics and politicisation through struggling but expanding devolutionary democratisation will be key.
